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transportation of the cargo. Moreover, evidence showed that the holds had previously 
contained a cargo of rock salt contributing to the damage affecting the present condition 
of the cargo. The court affirmed the lower court's holding that a carrier cannot delegate 
its duty to provide a seaworthy vessel to another party. Finally, the Court of Appeals felt 
that peril of the sea defense was not available to defendants based on the lower courts 
analysis. 
The court affirmed that Bay Ocean was not a carrier within the meaning of 
COGSA and therefore, was not entitled to its package limitation. In Sabah, the court 
stated that the determination of whether a party is classified as a carrier under COSGA 
focuses on whether that party executed a contract of carriage with the shipper. Under 
COGSA a party is classified as a "carrier" and thereby covered by the $500-per-package 
limitation on liability if that party executed a contract of carriage with the shipper. It is 
undisputed that Bay Ocean is not explicitly named in the voyage charter between 
Western Bulk and Steel Coils. Nevertheless, Bay Ocean maintained that since it was a 
party to the time charter between Lake Marion and Western Bulk, they should be 
considered a "carrier" within the meaning of COGSA. The Fifth Circuit found the 
voyage charter was the applicable contract of carriage. However, even if the time charter 
held any weight, it would still not save Bay Ocean because it merely acted as agent in the 
charter, as evidenced by the express language contained in the time charter contract. In 
Robert C. Herd & Co. v. Krawill Machinery Corp. ,  359 U.S. 297 (1956), the Supreme 
Court clarified that agents do not qualify for the $500-per-package limitation, 
determining that Congress did not intend to limit liability of "negligent agents of a 
carrier." !d. at 301. For the foregoing reasons the decision of the district court was 
affirn1ed. 
Frank M. Jenkins 
Class of 2004 
DEFINITIONS OF "SEAMAN" AND "VESSEL IN NAVIGATION" D EFINED 
UNDER THE JONES ACT 
The New York Supreme Court erred in denying summary judgment to defendant 
City of New York where plaintiff was not a "seaman" nor working on a "vessel in 
navigation" as defined by the Jones Act (46 U .S.C. § 688) . 
Orr v. City of New York 
Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, Second Department 
304 A.D. 2d 541 
(Decided April 7, 2003) 
Plaintiff was employed by the defendant, City of New York ("City"), as a "marine 
oiler" or a "tankerman" at the St. George Terminal on Staten Island. Plaintiff was injured 
when he stepped off a gangplank onto a barge, where he slipped on oil. Plaintiff 
commenced action against the City pursuant to the Jones Act (46 U.S.C. § 688) which 
provided that "any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his 
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employment may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at law, with the right of 
trial by jury" (46 U.S.C. § 688). Thereafter, the City moved for summary judgment 
dismissing the complaint. The City contended that plaintiff was not a "seaman" within 
the meaning of the Jones Act because the barge at issue was not a "vessel in navigation." 
The New York State Supreme Court denied the City's motion and based their decision on 
a prior position that the City took in regards to plaintiffs claim for worker's 
compensation benefits for the aforementioned injuries. After trial a verdict was rendered 
in favor of the plaintiff and the City appealed. 
On appeal the Appellate Division, Second Department found that the Jones Act 
had not clearly defined the term "seaman." However, the court stated that the United 
States Supreme Court had set forth two essential requirements in order to identify a 
seaman: first that the employee's duties must contribute to the function of a vessel or to 
the accomplishment of its mission and second that the employee has a connection to a 
vessel in navigation. Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 368 (1995). The Supreme 
Court did not go on to define a "vessel in navigation." The Appellate Division, Second 
Department acknowledged that there was no binding precedent for them to follow, but 
they found the definition set for by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit to be 
persuasive. The Second Circuit set forth three factors to be considered when defining a 
"vessel in navigation." First, whether the structure was being used primarily as a work 
platform during a reasonable period of time immediately preceding the accident; second, 
whether the structure was moored or otherwise secured at the time of the accident; and 
third, whether, despite being capable of movement, any transportation function 
performed by the structure was merely incidental to its primary purpose of serving as a 
work platfom1. Tonnesen v. Yonkers Contracting Co . ,  Inc., 82 F. 3d 30, 36 (2d Cir. 
1996). 
In reviewing evidence submitted by the City's motion, the court found that the 
barge at issue was indeed not a "vessel in navigation." At the time of the incident the 
barge had no means of self-propulsion and was being used primarily as a work platform 
to fuel and oil ferries. The barge was also moored at the time of the accident and the last 
time it was used to transport cargo was back in 1 989 during a tugboat strike. The court 
held that this evidence was sufficient to support the City's argument that the barge was 
not a "vessel in navigation" and therefore, the Plaintiff was not a "seaman." 
The Appellate Division, Second Department further addressed the lower court's 
holding by looking to the City's prior position concerning the plaintiffs claim for 
worker's compensation. The plaintiff had applied for and received worker's 
compensation. At a proceeding for the claim, the City argued that benefits were only 
payable upon waiver of the plaintiffs federal claim under the Jones Act. The Supreme 
Court held this to mean that the City believed plaintiff was entitled to collect under the 
Jones Act. The Appellate Division found that the City did not make such an argument 
and that although the plaintiff received worker's compensation, it did not constitute a 
finding that the plaintiff was a "seaman." The order of the Supreme Court was reversed 
and the complaint dismissed. 
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